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by Liang Jing In 2009 China's economy grew rapidly relying on huge government investment. The consequences have however come as a shock to the Party’s commanding heights. They have become aware that China faces serious risk of simultaneous economic and social crises, resulting in the most serious crisis concerns since June 4, 1989. My guess is that the sense of crisis led the Chinese Communists to hold a major high-level but undeclared meeting. I base this on a speech Hu Jintao delivered on 3 February, which was the first mention of the meeting. The speech was unusual not only in content but also in form. Bo Xilai was unusually absent, hinting at a struggle in leading circles.[1] The NPC and CCPCC meetings gave outsiders an opportunity to judge what sort of “new Beijing Consensus” the high-level internal confrontations in the Party have given rise to. The first major consensus of the high levels of the Party is, I believe, that it can no longer rely on stimulating economic growth to avoid a sharp deterioration of the social crisis, but must to respond to it with all their force. This means not only speeding up the reform of social policy, but also means investing vast resources to prevent social unrest. Some people in the media have generated high expectations of the Party speeding up social reforms—hence the incident of 13 media including the Economic Observer daring to publish a joint editorial calling for reform of the household registration system. But they were immediately purged by the regime, and Premier Wen Jiabao's work report offered no substantial reform of the hukou system. It seems the CCP is primarily concerned not with social reform, but how to cope with the inevitable social conflict and unrest.[2], [3] Nanfang Zhoumo [Southern Weekend] ran an important page one story: “China’s system for ‘maintaining stability’ starting to take shape.” The first sentence of the story was: “In 2009 just past, the pressure on maintaining stability was no less than the ‘extraordinary year’ 2008, while the inputs of manpower and material resources were in fact even more.” The article revealed that the growth and scale of the resources invested by the CPC in response to growing social conflict has reached alarming levels. Yunnan announced that, starting in 2010, the province’s per capita standard of expenditure on 'comprehensive management' will double, while Liaoning, which had a fiscal revenue of 150 billion in 2009, reported that expenditure on maintaining stability reached as high as 22.32 billion yuan, up 15.5 % over 2008, equivalent to 500 yuan per capita for Liaoning’s 45 million people, and far exceeding the Government's education and health care spending per capita. This fact is not only explains the serious sense of crisis in high levels of the Party, but also has important policy implications.[4] The NPC and CPPPC published China’s defense budget for 2010. Breaking the double-digit growth of the past two decades, the increase declined drastically to 7.5%, and was widely felt to be sudden, but given the background of the surge in cost of China’s “maintain-ing stability”, this decision was not difficult to understand. The sense of crisis in the Party leadership will affect China's foreign policy. China is likely to restrain itself somewhat, in its relations with the US and other Western states in particular, return to Deng Xiaoping’s old policy of keeping a low profile. In political terms, a strong sense of crisis seems to have contributed to a consensus in the Party high levels, which is to avoid letting power struggles over the 18th National Party Congress (planned for 2011) threaten overall stability, and help each other deal with the severe economic and social crisis that is likely to break out. Hong Kong’s Mingjing [Mirror] magazine in December ran a story revealing the truth of assertions that Xi Jinping actively refused the post of Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, supporting news earlier appearing in Kaifang [Open] magazine. As a result, the actions of Bo Xilai became a focus of interest in political high level in the Party, and whether or not he will actively compete with the Party School faction for high office has also become a topic of speculation in the overseas media. Regardless of the truth of the report, Hu Jintao would obviously not want to see anything of the kind. By making a fool of himself over the Li Zhuang case, Bo greatly helped Hu’s cause. Did Hu Jintao use this to suppress Bo’s political ambitions, to the point that Bo refused to attend Hu Jintao’s important speech on 3 February? This question has inspired all kinds of guesswork outside. The high Party leadership seems to be extremely sensitive on this, and so right after the opening of the 'Two Meetings' scheduled Bo Xilai to meet with foreign reporters. During the meeting, Bo on the one hand talked up the anti-mafia campaign in Chongqing, and defended the handling of the Li Zhuang case, while on the other safeguarding the united image of the Party leadership. [6], [7] In terms of domestic media reporting, the top Chinese leadership was more careful this time to create an open and enlightened corporate image for the outside world. Hu Jintao’s performance as general director of the 'Two Meetings' show was quite relaxed and happy. These sentiments may not have been complete pretence, as the CPC leadership’s consensus on a united response to the crisis is most favorable to him, allowing him to handle the thorny issue of the transfer of power at the 18th Party Congress more comfortably. This does not mean that the Centre has recaptured the policy initiative from the regions. Bo Xilai’s high-profile defence of the Chongqing anti-mafia campaign showed that the “new Beijing consensus” does not prevent high provincial officials from steering by their own light, Bo’s public overtures to Wang Yang were even more meaningful, reminding one of the situation in the late Qing: Central power succession in crisis, high provincial officials in control, both competing and cooperating and biding their time. Reports also came last week of the regime’s unreasonable detention of Fan Yafeng. This shows the CCP has not given up the principle of excluding and persecuting civic leaders. The “new Beijing consensus” is thus merely a consensus on “maintaining stability,” and not to change. And as long as the CCP does not change this principle, China is not far away from another 1911 Revolution. * Liang Jing, “Zhonggongde ‘xin Beijing gongshi’” [Communist China's 'New Beijing Consensus'], Boxun, 11 March 2010 [梁京： “中共的‘新北京共识’”， 博讯，2010年3月 11日 博讯( [1] “Hu Jintao zai shengbuji ganbu luoshi kexue fazhan guan yantaoban shang jiang” [Hu Jintao’s speech to the provincial and ministerial cadre’s Workshop on Scientific Development ], , 15 March 2010 [： “胡锦涛在省部级干部落实科学发展观研讨班上讲话”， ，2010年3月 15日 ( [2] “Zhongguo 13 jia meiti lianhe fasheng, huyu gaige huji zhidu” [Thirteen papers make joint statement caling for reform of the hukou system], Huaerjie ribao, 15 March 2010 [： “中国13家媒体联合发声 呼吁改革户籍制度”， 华尔街日报，2010年3月 15日 ( [3] Zhongguo jinzhi zhuanzai taolun 13 jia meiti lianhe shelun” [China bans relay of discussion of joint editorial by 13 papers], Duowei xinwen wang, 4 March 2010 [： “中国禁止转载讨论13家媒体联合社论”， 多维新闻网，2010年3月 4日 ( [4] Hu Ben, “Zhongguo ‘weiwen’ tizhi yinran chengxing” [China’s ‘stability maintainance’ system looms on the horizon], Nanfang baoye wang, 4 March 2010 [胡贲： “中国‘维稳’体制隐然成型”， 南方报业网，2010年3月 4日 ( [5] “Shijie jingya Zhongguo junfei 22 nian lai shouci jiang dao liangwei shu yixia” [World suprised as China’s military expenditure drops below 2 figures for the first time in 22 years], Huanqiu shibao, 5 March 2010 [： “世界惊讶中国军费22年来首次降到两位数以下”， 环球时报，2010年3月 5日 ( [6] Qin Hongyan, “Dahei bushi ‘heida’; Li Zhuang an chengxu hei” [‘Striking crime’ no ‘strike in the dark’: procedures in the Li Zhuang case were reasonable], Nanfang dushi bao, 7 March 2010 [秦鸿雁： “打黑不是‘黑打’ 李庄案程序合理”， 南方都市报，2010年3月 7日 ( [7] [8] Xu Zhiyuan, “Cong Zhongguo tese kan Zhongguo Moshi (er)” [The China Model in terms of Chinese characteristics (2)], Financial Times (Chinese ed.), 11 February 2010 [许知远： “从中国特色到中国模式（二）”， ，2010年2月 11日 ( [9] Hu Ben, “Zhongguo ‘weiwen’ tizhi yinran chengxing” [China’s ‘stability maintainance’ system looms on the horizon], Nanfang baoye wang, 4 March 2010 [胡贲： “中国‘维稳’体制隐然成型”， 南方报业网，2010年3月 4日 ( [10] “Xi Jinping wei ren junzhi zhi mi: ziji zhudong yaoqiu” [Riddle of Xi Jinping’ failure to take up military post: by his own request], Boxun, 15 March 2010 [： “习近平未任军职之谜：自己主动要求”， 博讯，2010年3月 15日 ( [11] Xiao Shu, “Fang zhou pinglun: yonggonghuang jingshi guojia touru xu jike zhuanxiang” [ Ark Comments: labor shortage an alert for immediate turn in state investment], Nanfang baoye wang, 25 February 2010 [笑蜀： “方舟评论：用工荒警示国家投入须即刻转向”， 南方报业网，2010年2月 25日 ( [12] “Bo Xilai tan Choingqing ‘dahei’: haixu jixu nuli” [Bo Xilai on the "strike against crime" in Chongqing: efforts need to continue], Zhongguo xinwen wang, 6 March 2010 [： “薄熙来谈重庆‘打黑’：还需继续努力”， 中国新闻网，2010年3月 6日 ( [13] “Lianghui kaifang touming feng: difang lingdao zhimian huiying redian min’gan huati” [Openness and transparency at the Two Meetings: local leaders confront and respond to sensitive issues], Xinhua wang, 6 March 2010 [： “两会吹开放透明风 地方领导直面回应热点敏感话题”， 新华网，2010年3月 6日 ( [14] Hu Ping, “Zhonggong xiang xuejiao huangzhi?” [Does the CCP want to copy the papacy?], Xin shiji, 15 March 2010 [胡平： “中共想学教皇制？”， 新世纪，2010年3月 15日 ( [15] Feng Zoufeng, “Bo Xilai: dahei qianzhang hai mei huan wan” [Bo Xilai: Bill for the strike against crime is yet to be paid], Nanfang dushi bao, 7 March 2010 [冯宙锋： “薄熙来:打黑欠账还没还完”， 南方都市报，2010年3月 7日 ( © Copyright 2010 by Boxun News Top of Page |
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