| Home |
| China |
| News |
| Finance |
| Technology&Science; |
| Travel |
| Entertainment |
| Comment |
| Special |
| US |
| News |
| Finance&Technology; |
| Entertainment |
| Comment |
| World |
| News |
| Life |
| Comment |
| Video |
| News |
| Life |
|
| Search |
All Rights Reserved
Userful Links
[UPI Asia]
[Reuters]
[Washington Post]
[CNN]
[China Free Press]
[CPJ]
[RSF]
[WPFC ]
[CECC]
[China Digital Times]
[EastSouth..Blog]
[France24]
Userful Links
[UPI Asia]
[Reuters]
[Washington Post]
[CNN]
[China Free Press]
[CPJ]
[RSF]
[WPFC ]
[CECC]
[China Digital Times]
[EastSouth..Blog]
[France24]
by Liang Jing The unrest in Xinjiang has dispelled any doubt that China faces a comprehensive crisis of governance, and Hu Jintao, having held power for years, cannot shirk responsibility for it. This fact, of course, has very serious political implications. Will Hu be challenged from within the party? Will he be able to turn the crisis into a good opportunity for political reform? What major impacts will the unrest in Xinjiang have on China’s future political situation? These are issues that must be considered by anyone who is concerned about China. There is no doubt that the riots in Xinjiang are the most serious political crisis Hu has faced since taking office; that he had to abandon an important international summit meeting showed that he is fully aware of this. In a political entity having even the slightest mechanisms of healthy competition, the outbreak of an even on this scale, Hu's power would have been challenged, but the situation in China is precisely that there is no mechanism of healthy political competition, hence, at least in the face of it, Hu’s power will not encounter any direct challenge—his powers may even be pushed to a peak. A direct reason for Hu’s emergency return was that the urgency of the situation called for a large-scale mobilisation of the army, and no one apart from Hu had the power to mobilise the armed forces on a large-scale. At times of crisis, such arrangements no doubt improve Hu Jintao’s political position. Will Hu therefore take advantage of this crisis to carry out a major clean-out of the corrupt and incompetent regional bigwigs, replacing them with some clean new faces and carrying out a “New Deal” that is genuine and not fake? There are few who believe he will do so, because had he the ability, he’d have done it long ago—why did he have to wait until today? More importantly, Hu is very clear in his mind that his power and political fate are tied together with these corrupt bigwigs. After June Fourth, conservative forces within the CCP, who had gained great powers over the nomenklatura, carried out a quiet inner-Party purge. A large number of high-level regional leaders with both ability and political integrity were, due to their sympathy for Zhao Ziyang, deprived of power, but still worse, thanks to June Fourth a large number of shameless people who were skilled at worming their way in and selling themselves for advancement gained rapid promotion, and were placed in important positions. Zhang Dejiang, currently a Vice Premier, Wang Lequan, the modern “king of Xinjiang,” and Su Rong, first secretary of Jiangxi, are typical of this group. This is a group of opportunists without any political integrity and unconstrained by any ideology. They are without the slightest intellectual cultivation, and offer nothing constructive; a bunch of desperate gamblers who are prepared to do anything, they know that in this gamble for existence, they themselves will lose nothing, but will rather gain high and lucrative office as well as wealth. This group has, with the connivance of Jiang Zemin, carried out a total transformation of the CCP. They fly its banner, but do every evil it vowed to eradicate. This is history’s most ironic retribution on revolutionaries of times past. It was understandable that Jiang Zemin should want to use people of the likes of Wang Lequan, but why couldn’t Hu Jintao, on coming to power, replace them with people with more knowledge and vision, rather than continue allowing Wang to assume the office of a high official in the important and sensitive region of Xinjiang? The unrest in Xinjiang fully exposed the failure of Wang Lequan’s governance over the years, yet Hu Jintao not only didn’t dare remove Wang, as he had removed Meng Jiannong as Beijing mayor in the SARS crisis, but immediately affirmed Wang: why was this? Hu’s incompetence is an important personal factor, but personal factors can not be used to explain the elevation of the incompetent Hu Jintao to the highest power. The CCP’s legitimacy crisis, resulted in an unprecedented situation of mediocrities ruling the country. Wang Lequan is clearly unsuitable for major responsibilities, but is there any certainty that any of the mediocrities selected by Hu Jintao, even the most highly qualified, will be able to do better than Wang? Rule by mediocrities in fact excludes rule by the talented more systematically than does monarchy; the CCP in its twilight is incapable for producing capable ministers like Li Hongzhang or Zuo Zongtang in the late Qing Dynasty. The direct political consequences of the Xinjiang unrest, has been the closer uniting of mediocrities of various factions around Hu Jintao. Wang Lequan, despite operating in Xinjiang for over a decade and committing a host of evils, in order to stabilise the morale of the troops of medicrities, Hu still made every effort to give him a chance of stepping down decently. It will be more difficult for those forces within the Part who are unwilling to be mediocrities, and are determined to save the nation to open up the situation. Therefore, although the PRC's policies on nationalities were forced to make significant adjustments, it could not point to the right direction. It is reported that the Partly is likely to abandon the self-deception of the “autonomy of nationalities,” and will spend a lot of money on “national integration,” that is, speed up the sinicisation of the Uighurs. This, of course, cannot succeed, and is likely at the same time to lead to dissatisfaction of both Han and Uighur. [1] In short, as a result of Hu’s inability to engage in genuine reform of political power, the unrest in Xinjiang is likely to help him focus on concentrating power, using more resources to maintain stability during his term of office, making China’s “stability costs” continue to increase dramatically. [2] This will certainly further add to the CCP regime’s political risk in future, and add more variables to the Party’s 18th National Party Congress and China’s future political situation. * Liang Jing, “Xinjiang saoluan de zhengzhi houguo” [Political consequences of the Xinjiang riots], , 15 July 2009 [梁京： “新疆骚乱的政治后果”， ，2009年7月 15日 .]. [1] “Zhengzhiju yiti baoguang, dangjude minzu zhengce he weiwen zhengce mianlin zhongda zhuanbian” [Politiburo debates reveal regime’s ethnic policies and stabilisation strategy facing major changes], , 10 July 2009 [“政治局议题曝光，当局的民族政策和维稳策略面临重大转变”， 2009年7月 10日 (http://news.boxun.com/news/gb/china/2009/07/200907100136.shtml). [2] Xiao Shu, “Tianjia weiwen chengben weihe jiang bu xialai” [Why the natural cost of stability maintenance can’t be brought down], Dongfang zaobao, 28 June 2009 [笑蜀： “天价维稳成本为何降不下来”， 东方早报，2009年6月 28日 (http://www.newcenturynews.com/Article/gd/200906/20090628122716.html). translated by David Kelly China Research Centre University of Technology Sydney © Copyright 2009 by Boxun News Top of Page |
|
|